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JUXTAPOSITION AND INTENT: 
ANALYZING LEGAL INTERPRETATION 
THROUGH THE LENS OF LITERARY 
CRITICISM 
Disagreement exists within both the literary and legal communities 
about authorial intent’s proper role in interpretation.  In an effort to 
balance textualism’s strict limits with intentionalism’s risk of constructed 
meaning, this Comment approaches the debate from a literary perspective 
focused on the text but open to limited evidence of the author’s intended 
meaning.  Some literary critics suggest that evidence of an author’s 
understanding of and associations with particular words can provide a 
useful tool for objective interpretation.  A judge drawing on such evidence 
could analyze statutory text by juxtaposing a statute’s language with 
limited evidence of the enacting legislature’s understanding of the 
language’s meaning.  The resulting interpretation would remain grounded 
in the nature of the words used, but it would avoid imposing meaning 
upon the language because it would situate the disputed language within a 
larger statutory context.  Structural juxtaposition therefore might assuage 
the fears of text-focused judges who express concern that reliance on 
legislative intent creates opportunities for abuse.  To illustrate structural 
juxtaposition’s impact on interpretation, this Comment concludes with an 
evaluation of the opinions that constitute a circuit split over interpretation 
of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.  Examination of the opinions 
demonstrates that a statutory analysis that begins with a text’s language 
and then expands to include contextual information properly balances the 
legal need for determinacy against the temptation to impose meaning on 
statutory text. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Questions of intent arise in a broad variety of contexts, ranging from 
sports1 and criminal punishment2 to legal interpretation and literary 
criticism.  In the latter two contexts, literary critics and judges seek to 
ascertain the meaning of a written text.  Just as literary scholars must 
grapple with fluid and ambiguous language in literary texts, judges 
working with language must assign concrete meaning to the words 
included in statutes and constitutions.3  As a part of these efforts at 
interpretation, judges and literary critics alike periodically include 
language’s intended meaning as a factor for consideration: some judges 
seek to determine the legislature’s intent in enacting the statute,4 and 
some literary critics look for the author’s intended meaning for the work 
of literature.5  However, disagreement exists within both the literary and 
 
1.  E.g., NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2013 AND 2014 NCAA FOOTBALL 
RULES AND INTERPRETATIONS §§ 9-1-3 to -4 note 1, at FR-87 (Ty Halpin ed., 2013) 
(“‘Targeting’ means that a player takes aim at an opponent for purposes of attacking with an 
apparent intent that goes beyond making a legal tackle . . . .”). 
2.  E.g., WIS. STAT. § 939.23(4) (2013–2014) (“‘With intent to’ or ‘with intent that’ 
means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified, or is 
aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause that result.”). 
3.  See Ona Russell, The Literary Case for Legal Ambiguity, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., 
Aug. 2006, at 22, 24 (“Language may always be in flux, but it is all lawyers and judges have.”). 
4.  See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
5.  See, e.g., W.K. Wimsatt, Jr. & M.C. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, 54 SEWANEE 
REV. 468, 468–69 (1946) (situating the article within scholarly debate regarding intent); see 
also TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 45 (anniversary ed. 2008) 
(describing one critic as “an unabashed ‘intentionalist’, reckoning into account what the 
author probably meant and interpreting this in the most generous, decent, English sort of 
way”). 
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legal communities as to whether the intended meaning of a text should 
serve as a foundation for interpretation.6 
When deciding whether to use legislative intent as an interpretive 
factor, a legal interpreter could use an approach that synthesizes literary 
and legal interpretive techniques.  By drawing upon analytical tools 
favored by literary critics who oppose the use of authorial intent, a judge 
could engage in a structural analysis of statutory texts7 by juxtaposing a 
statute’s language with internal and intermediate evidence of the 
enacting legislature’s intended meaning.8 
Juxtaposition in that manner allows a legal interpreter to implement 
a statutory purpose grounded in the nature of the words used and in the 
legislature’s understanding of the meaning of those words.  But at the 
same time, it avoids imposing meaning upon statutory language.  Thus, 
structural juxtaposition can assuage the fears of text-focused judges 
concerned with the potential for abuse inherent in appeals to legislative 
intent.9  A judge who interprets a statutory provision in isolation runs 
the same risk of imposing meaning on the text as a judge who bases his 
or her reasoning on inferred legislative intent.  Only an interpretation 
that situates disputed language within a larger statutory context avoids 
imposed meaning. 
 
6.  See EAGLETON, supra note 5, at 41 (“The New Critics broke boldly with the Great 
Man theory of literature, insisting that the author’s intentions in writing, even if they could be 
recovered, were of no relevance to the interpretation of his or her text.”); Teresa Godwin 
Phelps & Jenny Ann Pitts, Questioning the Text: The Significance of Phenomenological 
Hermeneutics for Legal Interpretation, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 353, 370–71 (1985) (describing the 
textualist versus intentionalist debate in legal interpretation); Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra 
note 5, at 468 (discussing the interpretive consequences of a literary critic’s opinion regarding 
the role of authorial intent).  Compare Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law 
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in 
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 22 (Amy Gutman 
ed., 1997) (“The text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed.”), with Larry 
Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free 
Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 969 (2004) (“[O]ne cannot 
interpret texts without reference to the intentions of some author.”). 
7.  Maxwell O. Chibundu, Structure and Structuralism in the Interpretation of Statutes, 62 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1439, 1445–46 (1994) (“It would be unfortunate . . . if the . . . impulse to 
eschew the unfamiliar confines the use of structural analysis to the demonstrably fallacious 
search for ‘legislative intent.’”). 
8.  Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra note 5, at 477–78. 
9.  Scalia, supra note 6, at 17–18 (“[U]nder the guise or even the self-delusion of 
pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their own 
objectives and desires, extending their lawmaking proclivities from the common law to the 
statutory field.”). 
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A circuit split between the United States Courts of Appeals 
regarding the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act10 provides a series of 
opinions that can serve as an example for evaluating different 
interpretive approaches.11  Comparing opinions in which different courts 
interpret the same statutory language demonstrates that juxtaposition of 
statutory provisions effectuates statutory purpose while also generating 
an interpretation focused on the statutory text’s enacted language.12  
This juxtaposition-based analytical approach draws on literary 
criticism,13 legal scholarship,14 and interdisciplinary law and literature 
scholarship15 to examine the debates within the legal community and 
within literary criticism, respectively, regarding authorial intent’s proper 
role in interpretation.  Ultimately, a comparison of the opinions in the 
circuit split regarding the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act16 illustrates 
that interpretation accounting for context properly balances the legal 
need for determinacy against the temptation to impose meaning on 
statutory text.17 
 
10.  The split involves conflicting interpretations of the Act’s unauthorized access 
provisions in the employment context.  Note, The Vagaries of Vagueness: Rethinking the 
CFAA as a Problem of Private Nondelegation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 751, 752 (2013) (“[A] 
circuit split has developed regarding whether, or under what circumstances, an employee 
violates the CFAA by misappropriating an employer’s trade secrets.” (citing Audra A. Dial & 
John M. Moye, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and Disloyal Employees: How Far 
Should the Statute Go to Protect Employers from Trade Secret Theft?, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1447, 
1453–62 (2013))). 
11.  See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012); 
United States. v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); United States v. Rodriguez, 
628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010); Int’l 
Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Michelle L. Evans, 
Establishing Access “Without Authorization” Under Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 132 AM. 
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 105, § 3, at 116 (2013); Dial & Moye, supra note 10, at 1453–62; 
Daren M. Orzechowski, Bijal V. Vakil & Carmen Lo, A Widening Circuit Split in the 
Interpretation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, WHITE & CASE (Sep. 13, 2012), http://w
ww.whitecase.com/articles-09132012/, archived at http://perma.cc/S5QW-RDHA (introducing 
the disagreement among the federal courts of appeals regarding the proper interpretation of 
language in the statute providing penalties for accessing a computer system without 
authorization). 
12.  See infra Part III.C. 
13.  See infra Part II.A. 
14.  See infra Part II.B. 
15.  See infra Part II.C. 
16.  See infra Parts III.A–B. 
17.  See infra Part III.C. 
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II. INTENT IN LEGAL AND LITERARY ANALYSES 
Disputes over the role of intent in literary analysis and in statutory 
interpretation arise out of each discipline’s core goal of discerning 
meaning from written language.  Literary critics disagree as to whether 
the author’s intention should govern the meaning of a work of 
literature.18  In the context of legal interpretation, the legislature takes 
the place of the author as the potential source of controlling intent.19  As 
a result of law’s shared medium with literature—language—and their 
consequent similar interpretive conflicts, an interdisciplinary field of law 
and literature scholarship developed in an attempt to apply insights 
from literary analysis to the interpretation of legal texts.20 
A. Authorial Intent in Literary Criticism 
Readers who endeavor to interpret a literary work use the 
relationships among the words on the page to attempt to find meaning 
conveyed by the text.21  Meaning derives from the “compound of ideas 
and judgment[s]” that the text communicates or, at least, seems to 
communicate.22  Literary critics, though, disagree regarding the 
appropriate elements that an interpreter may identify as infusing the 
literary communication with meaning.23  Some critics view a text’s 
author as a natural source for the meaning of a literary text.  But others 
 
18.  Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra note 5, at 468–69 (“There is hardly a problem of 
literary criticism in which the critic’s approach will not be qualified by his view of 
‘intention.’”); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE 307 (3d ed. 2009) 
(“Possible attitudes toward fidelity to an author’s conscious intentions thus range from a 
narrow intentionalism at one end, through formalism in the middle, to deconstruction (and 
postmodernism more generally) at the other end.”). 
19.  Scalia, supra note 6, at 16 (“You will find it frequently said in judicial opinions . . . 
that the judge’s objective in interpreting a statute is to give effect to ‘the intent of the 
legislature.’”). 
20.  GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF LAW 3 (2000) 
(“This scholarship employs the techniques and principles of literary criticism, theory, and 
interpretation to better understand the writing, thought, and social practice that constitute 
legal systems . . . .”).  Applied correctly, literary analysis may benefit legal interpretation by 
“illuminating the meanings of a particular legal dispute, fashioning a normative argument 
adapted to a particular cultural context, or grasping and transcending the limits of a point of 
view.”  Id. at 18. 
21.  See TERRY EAGLETON, HOW TO READ LITERATURE 119 (2013) (“[T]he work does 
not come to us with much of a setting at all.  Instead, it creates its own setting as it goes along.  
We have to figure out from what it says a background against which what it says will make 
some sense.”). 
22.  H. PORTER ABBOT, THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO NARRATIVE 76 (2002). 
23.  See Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra note 5, at 468. 
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argue that the nature of texts as constructs of language requires that 
interpreters rely only upon the texts themselves, without reference to 
any external sources of meaning.24  Taken to an extreme, focus on 
language can even lead to the conclusion that language cannot convey 
meaning at all, that language is inherently indeterminate.25  Across this 
spectrum of interpretive outcomes—ranging from meaning derived 
from authorial intent to entirely indeterminate language—an 
intermediate approach that relies upon limited evidence of authorial 
intent as the source of determinate meaning for a text’s language 
provides a literary perspective that a legal scholar could employ. 
1. Authorial Intent as a Source of Meaning 
An intent-based interpretation of a literary work relies upon the 
assumption that “a single creative sensibility” underlies and gives 
meaning to the text.26  As described by literary theorist Terry Eagleton, 
this assumption implies that “the meaning of a literary work . . . is 
identical with whatever ‘mental object’ the author had in mind, or 
‘intended’, at the time of writing.”27  Interpreters who rely upon this 
assumption that an authorial intention both exists and gives meaning to 
the text presume that a reader’s inferences regarding meaning occur 
because the author intended to communicate certain ideas to the 
reader.28 
 
24.  Compare ABBOT, supra note 22, at 95–97 (“[T]he ideas and judgments that we infer 
from the narrative are understood to be in keeping with a sensibility that intended these 
effects.  Some would say that this is the only valid way to read a narrative.”), with Wimsatt & 
Beardsley, supra note 5, at 468–70 (“[T]he design or intention of the author is neither 
available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art . . . .”). 
25.  See EAGLETON, supra note 5, at 126 (“[L]iterature for the deconstructionists 
testifies to the impossibility of language’s ever doing more than talk about its own 
failure . . . .”). 
26.  ABBOT, supra note 22, at 95. 
27.  EAGLETON, supra note 5, at 58. 
28.  See ABBOT, supra note 22, at 95 (“[T]he ideas and judgments that we infer from the 
narrative are understood to be in keeping with a sensibility that intended these effects.”); see 
also S.H. BURTON, THE CRITICISM OF PROSE 2 (1973) (describing intent as “the purpose 
underlying . . . writing”).  Explaining the method for analyzing the author’s intent, Burton 
suggests that  
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In a variation on intent-based interpretation, some critics suggest 
that readers analyzing authorial intentions should refer to an implied 
author, rather than the real author, when seeking to “anchor the 
narrative” in a source that serves as the origin of the text’s underlying 
communication.29  This hypothetical author serves as a repository for the 
“implied authorial views” that a reader infers from the text; eventually, 
this implied author becomes a construct that is consistent with “all the 
elements of the narrative discourse” of which the reader is aware.30  
Although an implied author may grow out of the beliefs and 
perspectives held by the text’s real author, the nature of an implied 
author can also depart from the identity of the real author by adopting a 
viewpoint different—and even divergent—from that of the real 
author.31  However, reference to an implied author as a construct 
separate from the real author begins to undermine the focus on 
authorial intent because it suggests that “the best evidence for the 
author’s intention is usually to be found in the text,” from which readers 
infer the nature of the anchoring implied author.32 
2. The Intentional Fallacy, New Criticism, and Objective 
Interpretation 
In contrast to the intentional approach, The Intentional Fallacy by 
W.K. Wimsatt Jr. and M.C. Beardsley, a key text for proponents of New 
 
the writer may be trying to communicate information, to arouse feeling, to form 
opinions.  He may be trying to do all or some of these things at once.  The critic 
must become aware of what is being attempted and, in relation to . . . each passage 
that he reads, he must refine his description of intention from a broad category into 
an accurate particularisation.  Grasp of meaning and sensitiveness to tone are, of 
course, crucial to success in discerning intention. 
Id. at 2–3. 
29.  ABBOT, supra note 22, at 77.  For a discussion of the critical debate surrounding use 
of the implied author, see generally TOM KINDT & HANS-HARALD MÜLLER, THE IMPLIED 
AUTHOR: CONCEPT AND CONTROVERSY 69–104 (Alstair Matthews trans., 2006). 
30.  ABBOT, supra note 22, at 77 (emphasis omitted). 
31.  See id. at 77–78 (“After all, the real author is a complex, continually changing 
individual of whom we may never have any secure knowledge. . . . [¶]  The real author may be 
open to many views that are actually condemned in the narrative.  The real author may even, 
within a space of time, find her own work repugnant and repudiate it.”). 
32.  MATTHEW CLARK, NARRATIVE STRUCTURES AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE SELF 
10 (2010); see also POSNER, supra note 18, at 292 (“One element of authorial intention is the 
intention that the reader consider the author a particular kind of person.  The reader forms 
this belief by inference from the book itself.  So the implied author—who might better be 
called the inferred author—stands between the real author and the reader.”). 
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Criticism,33 presents an argument for objective interpretation of literary 
texts without reference to an author’s subjective intent.34  According to 
Wimsatt and Beardsley, a literary work becomes “detached from the 
author at birth and goes about the world beyond his power to intend 
about it or control it.”35  As a result, the text “belongs to the public.  It is 
embodied in language, the peculiar possession of the public, and it is 
about the human being, an object of public knowledge.”36  
Consequently, an interpretation of a literary work can be valid 
regardless of the interpretation’s adherence to the meaning that the 
author originally, subjectively sought to communicate through the text. 
Assessing the role of authorial intent in literary scholarship, Wimsatt 
and Beardsley describe the “difference between internal and external 
evidence for the meaning of a [literary work]” and argue against the use 
of external evidence for literary interpretation.37  Internal evidence 
refers to the public information conveyed by a piece of literature, which 
an interpreter “discover[s] through the semantics and syntax of a 
[literary work], through . . . habitual knowledge of the language, through 
grammars, dictionaries, and all the literature which is the source of 
dictionaries.”38  External evidence, on the other hand, includes 
information that is “not a part of the work as a linguistic fact: it consists 
of revelations . . . about how or why the poet wrote the poem.”39  Often 
consisting of a text itself—perhaps in the form of the author’s notes, 
outlines, or journals—external evidence cannot provide insights about a 
 
33.  See EAGLETON, supra note 5, at 42 & 210 n.26; see also Richard A. Posner, Law and 
Literature: A Relation Rearguard, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351, 1362 n.44 (1986) (referring to Wimsatt 
and Beardsley as an important text for New Critics).  Eagleton discusses the history of New 
Criticism, introducing its combination of a “stress on the text’s internal unity with an 
insistence that, through such unity, the work ‘corresponded’ in some sense to reality itself.”  
EAGLETON, supra note 5, at 41.  For New Critics, a text could “be plucked free of the 
wreckage of history and hoisted into a sublime space above it.”  Id. at 42.  See generally id. at 
38–46 for Eagleton’s full introduction to New Criticism. 
34.  Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra note 5, at 468. 
35.  Id. at 470. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. at 477. 
38.  Id.  New Critics treated meaning as something “public and objective, inscribed in 
the very language of the literary text, not a question of some putative ghostly impulse in a 
long-dead author’s head, or the arbitrary private significances a reader might attach to his 
words.”  EAGLETON, supra note 5, at 42. 
39.  Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra note 5, at 477–78. 
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text because it, too, is subject to questions about the intentions that 
undergird its creation.40 
Wimsatt and Beardsley then introduce a concept that they call 
“intermediate” evidence.41  Describing a continuum between internal 
and external evidence, Wimsatt and Beardsley characterize intermediate 
evidence as a  
kind of evidence about the character of the author or about 
private or semi-private meanings attached to words or topics by 
an author . . . .  The meaning of words is the history of words, . . . 
and the associations which the word had for him, are part of the 
word’s history and meaning.42 
After defining these three kinds of evidence of meaning, Wimsatt 
and Beardsley suggest that criticism relying upon both internal and 
intermediate evidence does not necessarily entail inquiry into the 
author’s intention because, “while [the intermediate evidence] may be 
evidence of what the author intended, it may also be evidence of the 
meaning of his words and the dramatic character of his utterance.”43  
Any reader interpreting a text can recognize internal evidence of 
meaning conveyed by the language.  And an interpreter might seek out 
additional, intermediate evidence that provides insights regarding the 
language itself, rather than insights regarding the author’s beliefs about 
the text.  Therefore, an interpretive approach that uses internal and 
intermediate evidence of intended meaning allows an interpreter to 
account for the context surrounding a work’s creation without 
 
40.  See id. at 477–78, 484 (“[N]otes tend to seem to justify themselves as external 
indexes to the author’s intention, yet they ought to be judged like any other parts of a 
composition (verbal arrangement special to a particular context), and when so judged their 
reality as parts of the poem . . . may come into question.”). 
41.  Id. at 478. 
42.  Id.  To distinguish intermediate evidence of meaning from external evidence of 
meaning, Wimsatt and Beardsley discuss one critic’s interpretation of the poem Kubla Khan 
by Samuel Taylor Coleridge.  Id. at 478–79; see also Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Kubla Khan, in 
THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 1554 (M.H. Abrams ed., 5th ed. 
1987).  Although they concede that “by looking up the vocabulary of ‘Kubla Khan’ in the 
Oxford English Dictionary, or by reading some of the other books there quoted, a person may 
know the poem better” (a kind of intermediate evidence of the poem’s meaning), they 
emphasize their opposition to external evidence of the author’s intent: “There is a gross body 
of life, of sensory and mental experience, which lies behind and in some sense causes every 
poem, but can never be and need not be known in the verbal and hence intellectual 
composition which is the poem.”  Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra note 5, at 479–80. 
43.  Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra note 5, at 478. 
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necessarily conducting an inquiry into the author’s methods or internal, 
subjective purposes for creating the text.44 
3. Deconstruction, the Failure of Language, and the Collapse of 
Meaning 
Departing further still from the use of authorial intent, 
deconstructive interpretation of literature suggests that literary texts 
are, essentially, “ambiguous and indeterminate.”45  Derived from the 
writings of philosopher Jacques Derrida, deconstructionism posits that, 
although traditional conceptions of language treat the meaning of words 
as based upon an “unassailable foundation, a first principle or 
unimpeachable ground upon which . . . meanings may be constructed,” 
the foundational principles themselves exist as “products of a particular 
system of meaning.”46  As a result, language cannot convey exact 
information, only metaphors suggesting a particular meaning.47  A 
person engaging in a deconstructionist reading of a literary text 
therefore runs the risk of becoming “suspended between a ‘literal’ and a 
figurative meaning, unable to choose between the two, and thus cast 
dizzyingly into a bottomless linguistic abyss by a text which has become 
‘unreadable.’”48  At its core, then, “literary language constantly 
undermines its own meaning.”49 
 
44.  Id.; see also EAGLETON, supra note 21, at 135 (“Authors may have long forgotten 
what they intended a poem or story to mean.  In any case, works of literature do not mean 
just one thing.  They are capable of generating whole repertoires of meaning, some of which 
alter as history itself changes, and not all of which may be consciously intended.”); POSNER, 
supra note 18, at 291–92 (“Because we do not have unmediated access to another person’s 
mind, intent is always something inferred or constructed. . . .  [T]he New Critics thought 
authorship a construct but insisted that the author be constructed from his work rather than 
from his biography and his extraliterary opinions.”). 
45.  EAGLETON, supra note 5, at 126. 
46.  See id. at 114; see also ABBOT, supra note 22, at 98 (“Derrida grounded this idea in a 
view of meaning as infinitely deferred and therefore infinitely unreliable as a foundation for 
any clear certainty of reference to the world that lies beyond it.”); BINDER & WEISBERG, 
supra note 20, at 390–91 (“[Derrida] challenges the integrity of all those cultural traditions 
that define themselves by their fidelity to a canon or a sacred text.”). 
47.  See EAGLETON, supra note 5, at 126; see also POSNER, supra note 18, at 278 (“It is 
just as logical, just as natural—deconstruction claims—to subordinate the communicative 
function of discourse to the communication-impeding effects of the signifiers that the speaker 
or writer uses and thus to attend to the relation between them and concepts other than the 
one intended to be signified.”). 
48.  EAGLETON, supra note 5, at 126 (“[D]econstruction sees social reality less as 
oppressively determinate than as yet more shimmering webs of undecidability stretching to 
the horizon.”).  For an exploration of language and meaning in a legal context, see Dennis W. 
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4. Literary Lessons for Legal Analysis 
Among these three perspectives—intentionalism, objective 
interpretation, and deconstructionism—Wimsatt and Beardsley’s 
argument for interpretation based on internal and intermediate 
evidence is the approach most likely to prove useful for legal 
interpretation.  This perspective begins with the crucial supposition that 
literary texts exist as a result of an intentional act of creation; “[a] poem 
does not come into existence by accident.”50  Consequently, Wimsatt 
and Beardsley’s approach remains valid for evaluation of statutory 
language, which necessarily has the force of law because of intentional 
conduct on the part of the enacting body.  By advocating for using both 
internal and intermediate evidence when evaluating intentionally 
created works, Wimsatt and Beardsley offer an interpretive approach 
that bridges intentionalism and deconstructionism.  Through 
intermediate evidence that accounts for the meaning an author 
associated with words used in a public text,51 Wimsatt and Beardsley 
accept a limited form of authorial intended meaning.  And they also 
avoid deconstructionism’s pitfalls by affirming that words can have a 
particular, determinate meaning.52  Attributing determinate meaning to 
 
Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional “Meaning” for the 
Uninitiated, 96 MICH. L. REV. 461 (1997). 
49.  EAGLETON, supra note 5, at 125.  Strict application of the principle that texts are 
indeterminate also leads to the unnerving conclusion that text-based disciplines like 
“[p]hilosophy, law, [and] political theory work by metaphor just as poems do, and so are just 
as fictional.”  Id. at 126 (emphasis added).  Within the context of law-and-literature 
scholarship, application of deconstructive principles to legal texts leads to “critical scholarship 
that treats law as language and views all language use as a figurative or literary practice of 
signification.”  BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 20, at 378.  Judge Posner notes that, in 
practice, “one should not be surprised that deconstruction in law, except when the word is 
used merely as a synonym for text skepticism, bears little resemblance to deconstruction in 
philosophy or literary theory.”  POSNER, supra note 18, at 280 (footnote omitted).  Rather, 
“[d]econstruction in law has come to mean identifying latent contradictions in legal reasoning 
or legal doctrine.”  Id. 
50.  Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra note 5, at 469.  A work of literature, like statutory 
language enacted into law, “belongs to the public” and “is embodied in language, the peculiar 
possession of the public.”  Id. at 470. 
51.  Id. at 478. 
52.  Id. (“The meaning of words is the history of words, and the biography of an author, 
his use of a word, and the associations which the word had for him, are part of the word’s 
history and meaning.”).  In an endnote, they also add that the “history of words after a poem 
is written may contribute meanings which if relevant to the original pattern should not be 
ruled out by a scruple about intention.”  Id. at 488 n.12.  Such a comment further highlights 
the applicability of intermediate evidence to legal interpretation by evoking an evolution of 
meaning consistent with common law judicial interpretation, through which the meaning of 
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language therefore results in an interpretation that emphasizes the 
language of the text at issue while simultaneously accounting for context 
in the form of a limited type of meaning as intended by the author. 
B. Legislative Intent in Legal Analysis 
Judges and legal scholars, like literary critics, spent much of the 
twentieth century engaged in a debate regarding the necessity and 
efficacy of relying on authorial intent when determining the meaning of 
legal texts.53  Advocates for the use of legislative intent treat statutory 
texts as the product of authors seeking to communicate a particular idea; 
proper interpretation, they argue, therefore necessarily requires 
reference to the original purpose that gave rise to the communication.54  
From this perspective, appropriate judicial respect for the separate 
power of the legislature requires deference to the legislature’s intention 
when enacting the statute.55  In contrast, textualists argue against the 
subjective nature of such analysis, preferring interpretation based upon 
objective information—specifically, an enacted statute’s language.56  
Outside of the ongoing debates between textualists and intentionalists, 
an alternative perspective—structuralism—draws upon both 
approaches to advocate for interpreting individual statutory provisions 
in a manner that obtains meaning by juxtaposing individual provisions 
with the structure created by their statutory context.57 
 
statutory language changes—if only incrementally—across successive interpretations with the 
passing of time. 
53.  See generally Phelps & Pitts, supra note 6, at 370–75 (discussing the academic debate 
between textualists and intentionalists, and noting their common assumption that “the valid 
meaning of a text was created in the past” and remains binding in the present); Max Radin, 
Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930) (introducing the argument against use 
of legislative intent); Michael Robertson, The Impossibility of Textualism and the 
Pervasiveness of Rewriting in Law, 22 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 381, 390 (2009) (arguing that legal 
interpretation necessarily requires reference to legislative intent); Scalia, supra note 6 
(advocating for textualism). 
54.  See, e.g., M.B.W. Sinclair, Statutory Reasoning, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 299, 323 (1997). 
55.  See id. at 325–26. 
56.  See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 6, at 17; cf. Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative 
History Be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 813 (1998) (“The two 
Houses and the President agree on the text of statutes, not on committee reports or floor 
statements.  To give substantive effect to this flotsam and jetsam of the legislative process is 
to short-circuit the constitutional scheme for making law.”). 
57.  See Chibundu, supra note 7, at 1440–48 (“[T]he use of structure in interpretive 
theory permits the functional alignment of ‘fluctuating humanistic values’ to ‘rules of law.’ As 
such, structural analysis presents an effective bridge of the theoretical concerns that are the 
driving impulses behind the literary-based approaches of the deconstructive movement and 
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1. Textualism Versus Legislative Intent 
Like literary critics who use authorial intent when interpreting 
literary texts, some judges and legal scholars believe that “discerning 
intent must be the goal of every legal interpreter.”58  The search for the 
legislative intent behind a statute becomes a search for “the role the 
legislature intended the statute to play in society”59 because “a text only 
exists if it was deliberately produced by an author in order to express a 
meaning intended by that author.”60  Understanding the meaning of the 
language that forms legal texts thus requires evaluating a variety of 
factors; the interpreter must consider a broad “context that includes 
much more than just syntax and semantics and even assumptions about 
authorial intention.”61  As a result of this dependence on context and 
intended meaning, intentionalists argue that proper interpretation of a 
legal text requires the interpreter to engage in “the activity of 
ascertaining accurately what the author of that text intended it to 
mean.”62 
Emphasizing the primacy of statutory text in judicial interpretation, 
the textualist approach to legal interpretation focuses on statutory 
language in a manner similar to New Criticism’s preference for internal 
evidence.63  A textualist approach holds that “[t]he text is the law, and it 
is the text that must be observed.”64  Therefore, “[i]t is the law that 
governs, not the intent of the lawgiver. . . .  Men may intend what they 
 
the law as a humanities school, and the ambivalent empiricism of the conventional schools of 
legal interpretation.” (footnotes omitted)). 
58.  Alexander & Prakash, supra note 6, at 991. 
59.  Sinclair, supra note 54, at 323. 
60.  Robertson, supra note 53, at 387 (“Words alone, without an animating intention, do 
not have power, do not have semantic shape, are not yet language . . . .” (quoting Stanley 
Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629, 632–33 (2005)); see also 
Phelps & Pitts, supra note 6, at 371 (“[I]ntentions may be ascertained from the text itself, as in 
textualism.  Unlike textualism, however, an interpreter also may seek out evidence of intent 
in extrinsic sources, such as legislative proceedings and minutes.”). 
61.  Robertson, supra note 53, at 396. 
62.  Id. at 400. 
63.  See Scalia, supra note 6, at 22. 
64.  Id.; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory 
Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 66 (1988) (characterizing the search for 
legislative intent as a process of “creation” rather than “interpretation”).  Judge Easterbrook 
goes on to criticize judges who attempt to “justify” judicial creation by “show[ing] that they 
have been authorized to proceed in the fashion of the common law.  To claim to find missing 
answers by ‘interpretation’ is to seize power while blaming Congress.”  Id.  Instead, Judge 
Easterbrook suggests, “An appropriately modest judicial role would depend less on imputed 
intent—‘intent’ that ultimately can be found only in the mind of the judge.”  Id. 
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will; but it is only the laws that they enact which bind us.”65  Justice 
Scalia has quoted Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. for a consequence 
of this approach: “We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask 
only what the statute means.”66  This reflects the argument made by Max 
Radin, an early advocate for intention-free interpretation, in 1930: “A 
legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection with words 
which some two or three men drafted, which a considerable number 
rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving majority might 
have had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and 
beliefs.”67  Proponents of the textualist approach argue that, “under the 
guise . . . of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges 
will . . . pursue their own objectives and desires, extending their 
lawmaking proclivities from the common law to the statutory field.”68 
In response, intentionalist critics argue that textualist judges who 
rely exclusively on statutory language do not account for the meaning 
that the legislature seeks to convey with statutory text and, accordingly, 
fail to give sufficient deference to the legislature.69  From the perspective 
 
65.  Scalia, supra note 6, at 17.  In contrast, Professor Phelps and Chief Judge Manier 
(formerly Jenny Ann Pitts, now serving on the St. Joseph County Superior Court in Indiana) 
describe textualists as focused on the statutory language but nevertheless motivated by a 
desire to effectuate legislative intent: “Textualism takes the language of a legal provision as 
the ‘primary or exclusive source of law’ because the text alone is seen as the best guide to 
determining its author’s intentions.”  Phelps & Pitts, supra note 6, at 370–71 (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 
B.U. L. REV. 204, 205 (1980)). 
66.  Scalia, supra note 6, at 23 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Legal 
Interpretation, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 203, 207 (1920)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
67.  Radin, supra note 53, at 870; see also Kozinski, supra note 56, at 813 (“Collective 
intent is an oxymoron.  Congress is not a thinking entity; it is a group of individuals, each of 
whom may or may not have an ‘intent’ as to any particular provision of the statute.  But to 
look for congressional intent is to engage in anthroporphism—to search for something that 
cannot be found because it does not exist.”). 
68.  Scalia, supra note 6, at 17–18; see Radin, supra note 53, at 881 (“It is hard to see how 
subjectivism can be avoided or how the personality of the judge can be made to count for 
nothing in his decision on statutory interpretation as on everything else.”).  Some cynically 
describe the use of legislative history to infer legislative intent as “akin to ‘looking over a 
crowd and picking out your friends.’”  Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of 
Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) 
(referring to comments by Harold Leventhal), quoted in Daniel R. Suhr, Interpreting the 
Wisconsin Constitution, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 93, 106 & n.74 (2013) (quoting Mortier v. Town of 
Casey, 154 Wis. 2d 18, 39, 452 N.W.2d 555, 564 (1990) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting)). 
69.  See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 6, at 990–91; Sinclair, supra note 54, at 
323−26. 
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of those critics, “[t]he principle of legislative supremacy requires that 
intensional meaning, ‘the original meaning of the statute or the original 
intent of the legislature’ provide the relevant constraint on judicial 
decisions under it.”70  The intentionalist critique asserts that a textualist, 
by claiming that he or she can discern a clear meaning conveyed by the 
language of a statutory text, necessarily relies upon unacknowledged 
assumptions about the author’s intent to employ conventional rules to 
communicate meaning through the text.71  Ultimately, for an 
intentionalist, statutory “text is just a means of conveying meaning,” and 
various “extratextual factors,” including legislative intent, can “help 
illuminate a statute’s meaning.”72 
These critics of textualism seem to argue that legal interpreters 
should include information similar to the intermediate evidence 
described by New Criticism.73  Inquiries into the meaning of statutory 
text 
must involve extralinguistic entities, for otherwise we could have 
no basis of mutual intelligibility; but meanings also involve 
understandings, relationships with other symbols . . . .  Words, 
then[,] depend for their meanings on the words for distinguished 
or contracted meanings—intensions—just as they also depend 
on things in the world—extensions. . . .  The skeptics’ elementary 
error in this argument is to ignore the reality of linguistic 
meaning and how intent is expressed in language.74 
 
70.  Sinclair, supra note 54, at 325–26 (“If [by enacting a statute] the legislature intends 
to change society—to put moves on the prevailing norms and their implementation—then its 
presuppositions should control subsequent applications of the statute.”). 
71.  Robertson, supra note 53, at 390 (“Words, wholly conventional as they are, can bear 
any meaning at all, although in this or that real world context—drafting legislation, giving 
directions, ordering pizza—you might be well advised . . . to mean by your words what most 
people would assume . . . you to mean.” (quoting Stanley Fish, Intention Is All There Is: A 
Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s Purposive Interpretation in Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1109, 1124 (2008))).  This type of critique challenges the textualist position from the 
perspective of deconstruction, questioning the textualist’s underlying assumptions about the 
meaning of words.  See EAGLETON, supra note 5, at 114 (discussing deconstructionists 
questioning the existence of an “unimpeachable ground upon which a whole hierarchy of 
meanings may be constructed”). 
72.  Alexander & Prakash, supra note 6, at 990. 
73.  Compare Sinclair, supra note 54, at 323 (“[M]eanings . . . involve understandings, 
relationships with other symbols . . . .”), with Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra note 5, at 478 (“The 
use of biographical evidence need not involve intentionalism, because while it may be 
evidence of what the author intended, it may also be evidence of the meaning of his words 
and the dramatic character of his utterance.”). 
74.  Sinclair, supra note 54, at 323. 
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By focusing on the relational meaning that results from juxtaposition of 
words, this approach seems to invoke New Criticism’s intermediate 
evidence and its contemplation of “meanings attached to words” by the 
author of a text.75  Indeed, even a less-than-strict version of textualism 
provides that “[a] text should not be construed strictly . . . ; it should be 
construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means”;76 therefore, a 
textualist approach may also allow an interpreter to consider limited 
evidence of an author’s intended meaning in the form of the author’s 
understanding of particular words.  Relying upon contextual evidence 
thus allows for a thoughtful analysis of the meaning of a text’s words in a 
manner that does not necessarily involve reconstructing an overarching 
intent for the authoring legislature. 
2. Structural Analysis 
In contrast to purely textualist or purely intentionalist interpretation 
of statutory text, a structural analysis allows a legal interpreter to derive 
meaning “from an examination of relationships” between elements in a 
statute.77  Structural analysis encompasses “the juxtaposition of sections 
of a statute, the comparison of the uncontested provisions of those 
sections, and the procedural hurdles embedded in the enforcement of 
the agreed-upon rights conferred by such provisions,”78 and—without 
 
75.  See Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra note 5, at 478. 
76.  Scalia, supra note 6, at 23. 
77.  Chibundu, supra note 7, at 1463.  Professor Chibundu specifically defines structure 
as “the process of relying on the placement or juxtaposition of items of a statute one to 
another, or of a statute to other statutes.”  Id. at 1463–64.  Ultimately, Professor Chibundu 
claims that this approach results in interpretations that are “more transparently the product 
of the interpreter’s extrapolation of meaning than . . . of the foisted-on intent of the writer.”  
Id. at 1537–38. 
78.  Id. at 1531.  Earlier in the article, Professor Chibundu includes a thorough 
description of the comparative nature of structural analysis: 
Such relationships may vary from the placement of words within a section, the 
placement of sections within a statute, or the placement of statutes within a code.  
Invocation of concepts of structural interpretivism may range from application of 
more or less established linguistic rules of punctuation, syntax, and grammar—in 
which case structure may be viewed as “textualism” by another name—to the 
incorporation of certain of the common-law canons.  The structural relevance of 
other statutes to the interpretive process may be derived either from the similarity 
or dissimilarity of language—whether in terms of the words chosen or the internal 
organization of the provisions—or from a desire to create an intellectually coherent 
corpus in the sense of filling in most of the gaps while eliminating as many 
redundancies as possible.  In the latter case, structure is hardly textualist, but is 
rather “purposive.” 
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limiting principles—it would treat passage of legislation as “an 
invitation for further review and deconstruction by the parties, the 
courts, and . . . administrative agencies.”79  By focusing on relationships 
between words and between related statutory provisions, structural 
analysis “provides an intelligible mechanism for assisting and guiding 
the ongoing process[] of interpretation.”80 
Just as Wimsatt and Beardsley’s intermediate evidence balances 
literary criticism’s extremes of intentionalism and deconstructionism, 
structural analysis of legal texts can incorporate the strengths of 
textualist and of intentionalist interpretation.  Focusing on the language 
of a statutory text, a legal interpreter performing a structural analysis 
examines the relationships between words and then engages with the 
consequences of those relationships to determine the meaning of 
disputed language.  While the interpreter does discern a statutory 
purpose through this process, the resulting interpretation nevertheless 
adheres to the text itself, rather than to external evidence of an 
individual legislator’s understanding at the time of enactment. 
C. Law and Literature Scholarship 
During the 1970s, scholars from these two language-based disciplines 
began attempting to find points of convergence between legal and 
literary interpretation.81  These attempts often resulted in comparisons 
 
Id. at 1464 (footnotes omitted).  Thus, an interpreter who articulates a coherent, minimally-
redundant statutory purpose can effectuate that purpose and ascribe to disputed statutory 
language meaning consistent with that purpose.  See Karl. N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the 
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be 
Construed, 3 VAN. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950), reprinted in 5 GREEN BAG 2D 297, 301 (2002) (“If 
a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light of some assumed purpose.”). 
79.  Chibundu, supra note 7, at 1554–55. 
80.  Id.  Similar to structural analysis, Professor Akhil Reed Amar has argued for 
intratextual analysis in the Constitutional context.  Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999).  Professor Amar notes that, while textualists “focus[] intently on 
the words of a given constitutional provision in splendid isolation . . . , intratextualism always 
focuses on at least two clauses and highlights the link between them.”  Id. at 788.  At the same 
time, he also distinguishes his intratextual approach from structural analysis, which he 
perceives as “focus[ed] not on the words of the Constitution, but rather on the institutional 
arrangements implied or summoned into existence by the document.”  Id. at 790.  
Nevertheless, an analysis of statutory text that uses structural juxtaposition informed by 
literary theory benefits from Professor Amar’s focus on relational meaning between words 
and clauses.  See id. (“Just as intratextualism, as a variant of textual argument, often focuses 
on what is merely implicit in the text, so too intratextualism, as a variant of historical 
argument, may highlight what is only presumed to be the specific intent.” (emphasis added)). 
81.  See BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 20, at 3. 
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focused on identifying similarities between law and literature that 
ultimately fell short of providing illuminating commentary,82 and the 
movement faced a critique positing that literary theory cannot possibly 
provide insights relevant to legal interpretation.83  However, when 
conducting a structural analysis of statutory language, a legal interpreter 
can use the middle ground created by literary criticism’s internal and 
intermediate evidence to strike a balance between textualism and 
intentionalism, engaging with a statute by conducting a juxtaposition-
based examination that concentrates on the statutory language while 
simultaneously accounting for a narrow conception of legislative 
intent.84 
In a seminal essay, Professor Robert Weisberg collected and 
described early law and literature scholarship that applied literary 
analysis to legal interpretation, initially distinguishing scholarly writing 
about law-in-literature from writing about law-as-literature.85  
According to Professor Weisberg, law-in-literature scholars tend to 
focus on “the appearance of legal themes or the depiction of legal actors 
or processes in fiction or drama.”86  On the other hand, law-as-literature 
scholars parse legal texts such as “statutes, constitutions, judicial 
opinions, and certain classic scholarly treatises as if they were literary 
works.”87  Notably, law-as-literature scholars therefore “may assume 
that there has been conscious authorial control of the semantic and 
structural complexities of a legal text,” allowing the scholars to “subject 
the intrinsic text to the conventional techniques of ‘meaning’ 
interpretation normally applied to poems, plays, or novels.”88  
Accordingly, Professor Weisberg suggested that using these literary 
techniques allows law-as-literature scholars to “‘situate’ legal texts 
within a culture in a manner parallel to the way literary works are 
 
82.  See Robert Weisberg, The Law–Literature Enterprise, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 43 
(1988). 
83.  See Posner, supra note 33, at 1351. 
84.  See Chibundu, supra note 7, at 1445–46, 1531. 
85.  See Weisberg, supra note 82, at 1–2. 
86.  Id. at 1. 
87.  Id. 
88.  Id. at 2.  By acknowledging that legal writers intentionally create legal texts, 
Weisberg parallels Wimsatt and Beardsley, who accepted the existence of some “designing 
intellect as a cause of a poem.”  Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra note 5, at 469 (declining “to 
grant the design or intention as a standard”). 
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considered parts of a culture’s mythologies or moral or spiritual 
principles.”89 
As a part of the same paper, Professor Weisberg also criticized the 
state of early law and literature scholarship, arguing that critics had 
failed to effectively compare the disciplines.90  “Chiefly, we get a sort of 
syllogism that law and literature are related, that meaning in literature is 
highly contestable, and that therefore meaning in law may be 
indeterminate.”91  Arguing that, by this type of comparison, most law-as-
literature scholarship had simply “sought to exploit the analogy between 
legal and literary texts by treating legal texts as consciously crafted 
works” open to criticism “in terms of explicit or implicit intended 
meaning,” Professor Weisberg observed that “lawmaking is an 
intellectual act conditioned by formal political constraints that do not 
apply to literary expression.”92  Rather than merely drawing a 
comparison between law and literature, Weisberg suggested that law-as-
literature scholarship actually proves “illuminating only when 
discomfiting, or, better yet, subversive . . . of the apparent structure of a 
culture.”93  Literary readings of legal texts should “see through 
deceptive unity or community, toward the less visible stories, poems, 
and dramas that entangle law as they do the rest of culture.”94  From this 
perspective, using literary techniques to interpret legal texts can 
highlight implicit meaning in the legal language. 
In contrast to Professor Weisberg’s argument that literary criticism 
may prove useful as a tool for legal analysis, Judge Richard Posner of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has argued 
that “literature has little to contribute to the interpretation of statutes 
and constitutions.”95  He has offered various justifications for opposing 
application of literary techniques to legal analysis.  From Judge Posner’s 
perspective, “the functions of legislation and literature are so different, 
and the objectives of the readers of these two different sorts of mental 
 
89.  Weisberg, supra note 82, at 2. 
90.  Id. at 3. 
91.  Id. at 43.  Claims of indeterminacy in law and literature scholarship flow out of the 
deconstructionist approach in literary criticism.  See BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 20, at 
461 (discussing the ways in which “[d]econstructive criticism of law views law as a language” 
and, as a result, treats law as “literary language that subverts or deconstructs the structure 
that gives it meaning”). 
92.  Weisberg, supra note 82, at 3. 
93.  Id. 
94.  Id. at 66–67. 
95.  Posner, supra note 33, at 1351. 
 1860 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:1841 
product so divergent, that the principles and approaches developed for 
the one have no useful application to the other.”96  Emphasizing 
predictability and limits on judicial power, Judge Posner has rightly 
observed that, although “[i]t is a fairly harmless enterprise for New 
Critics to propose startling new readings of old works of literature, . . . if 
every lawyer and judge were free to imprint his own reading on any 
statute, . . . incredible chaos would ensue.”97  Furthermore, in an 
environment where judges “are not privileged to ignore those provisions 
that are hackneyed or unclear,” the literary technique of “attributing 
significance to every detail” creates “absurdities” in legal analysis 
because “[s]tatutes . . . are written in haste by busy people, not always of 
great ability or diligence.”98 
Ultimately, Judge Posner suggests that by “emphasizing the variety 
of possible interpretations of texts, literary critics may perhaps help 
judges to see that some seemingly obvious interpretations are in fact 
debatable,” but he questions “if they can teach judges any constructive 
lessons.”99  While literary analysis may help judges to see the possibility 
 
96.  Id. at 1374.  Elsewhere, Judge Posner has noted that a legislature enacting laws “is 
trying to give commands” both to judges and to the people who the laws will regulate.  
POSNER, supra note 18, at 308 (“A command is a communication, to be decoded in 
accordance with the sender’s intentions.  If a message is garbled in transmission you ask the 
sender to repeat it; that is intentionalism in practice.  If you cannot reach the sender, you try 
to glean from everything you know about him and the circumstances of the failed message 
what he would have done had he been on the spot. . . .  [T]he correct analysis is an 
intentionalist one.” (footnote omitted)). 
97.  Posner, supra note 33, at 1370; see also Teresa Godwin Phelps, “Reading as If for 
Life”: Law and Literature Is More Important than Ever, 43 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 133, 134 
(2008) (“Seen as abstract philosophical discourse divorced from the realities of life, the law 
and its interpretation can be manipulated at will.  It can justify exterminations, 
disappearances, and torture.”). 
98.  Posner, supra note 33, at 1372. 
99.  Id. at 1374–75.  Applying literary criticism to legal analysis may, for example, show 
that “legal and literary texts, and the words that compose them, may mean different things to 
different people or groups.”  Michael L. Boyer, Contract as Text: Interpretive Overlap in Law 
and Literature, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 167, 170 (2003).  For example, “literary theory 
might inform legal interpretation” regarding the parol evidence rule, offering insight as to 
“exactly when a judge in a contract dispute should look to evidence outside the written 
contract to discern the parties’ intentions.”  Id. at 171.  A judge who treats language as 
indeterminate may be more likely to find that the language of a contract is ambiguous on its 
face, instead choosing to “give effect to the parties’ intent.”  Id. at 173.  But see POSNER, 
supra note 18, at 318 (arguing that there is no “contradiction between being an intentionalist 
judge with regard to statutes and constitutional provisions and a formalist judge when dealing 
with contracts, reluctant to allow extrinsic evidence, including testimony about the 
contracting parties’ conscious intentions, to change the meaning suggested by the contractual 
text”). 
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of multiplicity of meaning, Judge Posner seems to see it as stopping 
short of giving legal interpreters new tools to identify a preferred 
meaning among reasonable alternatives. 
Despite this critique, law and literature scholarship has continued to 
evolve, as exemplified by the publication of Literary Criticisms of Law, 
in which Professor Guyora Binder joins Professor Weisberg to trace the 
history of law and literature scholarship and to argue that literary 
analysis of law allows for “interpret[ing] law as a cultural datum and 
analyz[ing] legal processes as arenas for generating cultural meaning.”100  
This perspective “recognize[s] that the literary is intrinsic to law insofar 
as law fashions the characters, personas, sensibilities, identities, myths, 
and traditions that compose our social world.”101  Because, like literary 
analysis, “law is an arena for contesting, negotiating, and fashioning 
meaning,”102 Professors Binder and Weisberg argue that legal 
interpretation is “a practice that constantly appropriates, reproduces, 
and reshapes a culture.”103 
Over the past decade, other scholars have observed that law and 
literature scholarship seems to have reached an impasse, remaining a 
topic of legal discourse but no longer offering new insights that can 
improve legal analysis.104  Where law and literature scholarship began as 
an effort to use literary techniques to illuminate new perspectives for 
legal analysis,105 more recent scholars have argued that 
“interdisciplinarity . . . tended to exaggerate disciplinarity, caricaturing 
 
100.  BINDER & WEISBERG, supra note 20, at 18. 
101.  Id. 
102.  Id. at 26. 
103.  Id. at 27. 
104.  See Julie Stone Peters, Law, Literature, and the Vanishing Real: On the Future of an 
Interdisciplinary Illusion, 120 PMLA 442, 449 (2005) (“[T]he interdisciplinarity of law and 
literature enacted a double movement that ran counter to its own project.  It sought to break 
down disciplinary boundaries, but, through the imaginary projection by each discipline of the 
other’s difference, it exaggerated the very disciplinary boundaries it sought to dissolve. . . .  In 
the disciplinary hall of mirrors, they met in the shared space of mutual projection, in work 
that acted out both sets of anxieties while repressing some of the most important insights of 
each discipline.”); Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836–39 (2005) 
(“Law’s simultaneous need and inability to banish literature makes law and literature a 
distinctively fraught enterprise.”). 
105.  Greta Olson & Martin A. Kayman, Introduction: From ‘Law-and-Literature’ to 
‘Law, Literature, and Language’: A Comparative Approach, 11 EUR. J. ENG. STUD. 1, 3 
(2007) (“The relationship between law and literature rests then on a notion of literature that 
has been apotheosised into a privileged repository of the ethical, one which would serve as an 
antidote to the legal formalism and theoretical relativism that beset lawyers and judges at 
their worst.”). 
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disciplinary difference through each discipline’s longing for something it 
imagined the other to possess.”106  While literary analysis of law has 
often highlighted qualities otherwise “stigmatized within the law, such as 
falsity, irrationality, and seductiveness,” these challenging perspectives 
on legal interpretation have allowed for only “anemic” growth of the 
joint law and literature enterprise.107 
Despite these challenges to comparative analysis, law and literature 
nevertheless continues to provide a useful approach to analyzing legal 
texts because the two fields share a medium: language.108  At its core, 
“[l]aw is a machine made of words,” and those words, like the words of a 
literary text, are subject to interpretation.109  As a result, any difference 
in the process and consequences of interpretation between legal texts 
and literary texts stems from their divergent contexts, rather than from 
their respective natures as texts.110 
Recognizing this primacy of context allows for the use of literary 
theories regarding authorial intent to bridge the gap in the legal debate 
 
106.  Peters, supra note 104, at 449.  But see Phelps, supra note 97, at 149 (“The law and 
literature movement, because it integrates law and literature, does not undercut the 
foundations of the law; it broadens them to include the life of the imagination. . . .  [W]e who 
do the law—judges, lawyers, and human rights activists—may better live lives in the law 
because the law and literature movement has furnished us with new ways of understanding 
what we do.”).  In his argument against the utility of literary techniques for legal interpreters, 
Judge Posner captures the impasse between the disciplines: “The literary intentionalist is a 
lawyer manqué; the legal New Critic is a literary critic manqué.  The former demands a type 
of constraint on interpretation that law rather than literature requires; the latter seeks a 
freedom of interpretation that literature but not law allows.”  POSNER, supra note 18, at 309–
10 (footnote omitted). 
107.  Yoshino, supra note 104, at 1838; see also Mark Kingwell, Let’s Ask Again: Is Law 
Like Literature?, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 317, 336 (1994) (“Nobody’s life would be lost if the 
practice of literary criticism were suddenly to collapse; but a collapse of the system of legal 
interpretation . . . could easily wreak social havoc. . . .  So it is crucial that a theory of legal 
interpretation take account of these practice-specific demands of law: its needs for a final 
adjudicator, a final answer, stability and commonality, and so on.”). 
108.  Yoshino, supra note 104, at 1838. 
109.  Id. 
110.  See Kingwell, supra note 107, at 351 (“Law is utterly like literature because it 
consists of written texts that are subject to interpretation. . . .  But law is utterly unlike 
literature in that the practices governed by its texts have quite different goals.  This difference 
may mean that the texts themselves have a different character . . . .”); Phelps, supra note 97, 
at 139 (“In the law, interpretation serves a practical purpose: there is a given case that gives 
rise to the necessity of the interpretation.  Naturally, a fundamental and critical difference 
exists in an act of interpreting a literary text, in which there is no specific application in mind, 
and an act of interpreting a law.”). 
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between intentionalists and textualists111 through a structural analysis of 
statutory text that accounts both for the language enacted into law by 
the legislature and for the meaning that the statute derives from its 
context.112  As discussed above, Wimsatt and Beardsley, in addition to 
accepting evidence of authorial intent internal to a literary text’s 
language, acknowledged that evidence of an author’s understanding of 
and associations with particular words can provide a useful tool for 
objective interpretation.113  If a legal interpreter begins a statutory 
analysis with the language of the text and then expands the analysis to 
include contextual information—essentially considering the 
intermediate evidence of authorial intent as described by Wimsatt and 
Beardsley—he or she can remain grounded in the statutory language 
while also accounting for some legislative intent.114  Expanding the 
 
111.  Kingwell, supra note 107, at 345–46 (“The truth of an interpretation concerns both 
its ‘plain message’ and its embeddedness within practices and institutions with determinate 
features . . . , for neither makes sense alone, and we cannot recover one without the other.”).  
For a discussion of the divergence between a New Critical and an intentionalist interpretation 
of the Eighth Amendment, see POSNER, supra note 18, at 294–95. 
112.  Chibundu, supra note 7, at 1446 (“[S]tructuralism . . . can and does function to 
bridge the purported chasm between academic theorizing on interpretive methodologies and 
the mundane practice of law by judges and lawyers.”); Kingwell, supra note 107, at 341 
(accounting for “authorial intention without sacrificing the authority of the text as object”).  
For a more expansive interpretive model relying on not only structural context but also social 
context, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 
1479, 1554 (1987) (“[S]tatutes are dynamic things: they have different meanings to different 
people, at different times, and in different legal and societal contexts. . . .  [F]ederal courts 
should interpret statutes in light of their current as well as historical context.”). 
113.  Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra note 5, at 478; see supra notes 37–44 and 
accompanying text. 
114.  See Sinclair, supra note 54, at 323 (emphasizing the intended role for the statute in 
society).  Critiquing legal interpretation’s dichotomy between textualists and 
deconstructionists, Professor Teresa Phelps also argues for a balanced approach to 
interpretation.  Phelps, supra note 97, at 136–38.  Similar to a structural approach that finds 
meaning through juxtaposition of statutory language, Professor Phelps finds meaning at the 
point where the legal text intersects with the interpreter.  Id. at 138–40.  Drawing on the 
interpretive methodologies of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Professor Phelps argues that legal 
interpreters must engage with the text that they seek to interpret: 
What occurs in an act of interpretation that yields the truth, then, is that the 
interpreter enters into a dialectic with the text, going openly to the text with 
unfettered questions.  The interpreter immerses himself in a paradoxical union of 
timelessness and history, using the language and horizons of the text itself as the 
medium through which understanding can occur.  The interpreter does not seek 
some objective meaning, but instead attempts to mediate the text into the present.  
She asks, “What do these words mean for us today, on this occasion, with these facts 
in front of us, in this act of being a judge?” 
. . . . 
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analysis further, an interpreter may then begin to juxtapose the disputed 
statutory provision with the intermediate evidence of intent as well as 
with other portions of the statute, performing a structural analysis that 
derives meaning from the relationships between all of the elements 
under consideration.115  By approaching the intentionalist versus 
textualist divide with a literary sensibility focused on the text but open 
to limited evidence of the author’s intended meaning, a legal interpreter 
can strike an appropriate balance between textualism’s strict limits and 
intentionalism’s risk of constructed meaning derived from an 
indeterminate legislative intent. 
III. INTENT IN A CONTEMPORARY CIRCUIT SPLIT: 
INTERPRETING THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT 
By its nature, a split within the United States Courts of Appeals 
involves a series of opinions in which judges reach their conclusions 
after applying differing interpretive approaches.  The manner in which a 
judge interprets statutory language necessarily places constraints on the 
conclusions that he or she can reach.116  A circuit split thus provides a 
useful vehicle for examining the outcomes that result from the use of 
particular interpretive techniques.  In particular, an analysis of the 
opinions in a circuit split regarding interpretation of the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) not only illustrates the consequences of 
limiting interpretation to statutory text (versus relying on legislative 
intent) but also highlights the advantages of using a structural approach 
to evaluate language in context. 
 
. . .  At the same time, the text itself is not endlessly fungible.  It has its own 
horizons, including the original meaning, the intent of the drafters, the plain 
meaning of the words, the historical moment in which it was written, the reason it 
was written and so on.  The merging of the richness of the text and the richness of 
the interpreter reveals true meaning. 
Id. at 138–40.  See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel 
Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., Crossroad Publ’g Co., 2d rev. ed. 1989) (1975). 
115.  See Chibundu, supra note 7, at 1531. 
116.  Cf. Amar, supra note 80, at 748 (“Interpreters squeeze meaning from the 
Constitution through a variety of techniques—by parsing the text of a given clause, by mining 
the Constitution’s history, by deducing entailments of the institutional structure it outlines, by 
weighing the practicalities of proposed readings of it, by appealing to judicial cases decided 
under it, and by invoking the American ideals it embraces.  Each of these classic techniques 
extracts meaning from some significant feature of the Constitution . . . .”). 
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The CFAA is a federal statute regulating unauthorized access to 
computer systems.117  Originally enacted as a criminal provision in 
1986,118 subsequent amendments have also created a civil cause of action 
under the statute.119  A person may incur criminal liability under the 
statute if he or she accesses a “protected computer” either “without 
authorization” or in a manner that “exceeds authorized access” and, as a 
result, engages in conduct such as (1) “obtain[ing] . . . information from 
any protected computer,”120 (2) advancing a fraudulent purpose,121 or 
(3) damaging the accessed computer.122  “Any person who suffers 
damage or loss by reason of a violation of [the CFAA] . . . may maintain 
a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and 
injunctive relief or other equitable relief.”123 
Although the CFAA provides definitions for the key terms 
“protected computer” and “exceeds authorized access,” it does not 
include a definition for “without authorization.”124  A “protected 
computer” includes computers “exclusively for the use of a financial 
institution or the United States Government,” as well as computers used 
“by or for” those entities and any computer “which is used in or 
affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication.”125  “[T]he 
term ‘exceeds authorized access’ means to access a computer with 
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the 
computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”126  
 
117.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2012). 
118.  Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030). 
119.  Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, sec. 290001(d), 
108 Stat. 1796, 2097–99 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g)); see also Evans, supra 
note 11, § 2, at 114–16. 
120.  18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). 
121.  Id. § 1030(a)(4). 
122.  Id. § 1030(a)(5). 
123.  Id. § 1030(g). 
124.  See id. § 1030(e); Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1576 (2010) (“[T]he courts have not yet settled on the 
broader question of what exactly makes access without authorization or in excess of 
authorization.  The statute simply does not define what makes access ‘without authorization.’  
As a result, there are a surprising number of instances in which citizens cannot know whether 
their conduct amounts to an unauthorized access.  The statutes simply do not say what the 
terms mean, and no precedents have provided clear answers.” (footnotes omitted)). 
125.  18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2); see also United States. v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 
2012) (en banc) (noting that the interstate commerce language means that the Act applies to 
“effectively all computers with Internet access”). 
126.  18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6). 
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Notably, because this definition turns upon the phrase “with 
authorization,” any interpretation of the phrase “exceeds authorized 
access” must occur in conjunction with an interpretation of the phrase 
“without authorization.” 
In the absence of a clear definition for the phrase “without 
authorization,” the courts of appeals have taken responsibility for 
interpreting the term,127 and the resultant circuit split provides a useful 
context for using the lens of literary criticism to examine conflicting 
approaches to statutory interpretation.  Recent court of appeals 
decisions—interpreting the phrase in the context of employee use of 
employer computer systems—have read the phrase narrowly, limiting 
the definition of “without authorization” to “the unauthorized 
procurement or alteration of information, not its misuse or 
misappropriation.”128  Earlier interpretations by other circuits read the 
language more broadly, finding that a person may use a computer 
“without authorization,” and as a result incur criminal or civil liability 
under the CFAA, by violating “limits placed on the use of information 
obtained by permitted access to a computer system.”129 
Inconsistent opinions in this circuit split provide fertile grounds for 
the application of the law and literature analytical techniques discussed 
above.  Examination of the five court of appeals decisions at the center 
of this interpretive debate will first illustrate the consequences of 
including legislative intent as a factor for analysis and then demonstrate 
that interpreting statutory texts by juxtaposing disputed passages with 
other statutory provisions and with limited evidence of intended 
authorial meaning ultimately leads to an interpretation that 
appropriately effectuates the purpose animating disputed statutory 
language. 
 
127.  See Evans, supra note 11, § 3, at 116; Orzechowski et al., supra note 11. 
128.  Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863 (quoting Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 
965 (D. Ariz. 2008)) (internal quotation mark omitted); accord WEC Carolina Energy 
Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he terms ‘without 
authorization’ and ‘exceeds authorized access’ . . . apply only when an individual accesses a 
computer without permission or obtains or alters information on a computer beyond that 
which he is authorized to access.”). 
129.  United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 2010); accord United States v. 
Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1260–61, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding a violation where a Social 
Security Administration worker used his access to Administration databases and “obtained 
personal information” about his romantic interests “for nonbusiness reasons”); Int’l Airport 
Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that, under agency 
principles, termination of employment meant that former employee no longer had 
authorization to access the employer’s computer). 
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A. Narrow Interpretation of the CFAA 
By interpreting the CFAA in a manner that focused on the statutory 
language but included limited references to legislative intent, the Fourth 
and Ninth Circuits both adopted narrow interpretations of the statute.  
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in United States v. Nosal130 exemplifies the 
narrow interpretation of the CFAA: “‘[E]xceeds authorized access’ . . . 
is limited to violations of restrictions on access to information, and not 
restrictions on its use.”131  After leaving his job at an executive search 
firm to start a business competing with his former employer, Nosal 
convinced some former colleagues to use their authorization to access 
his former employer’s confidential database to retrieve potential clients’ 
contact information, despite the firm’s “policy that forbade disclosing 
confidential information.”132  Holding that a person “exceeds authorized 
access” when he or she has authorization “to access only certain data or 
files but accesses unauthorized data or files,” the Ninth Circuit rejected 
the government’s argument that the statute should apply “to someone 
who has unrestricted physical access to a computer, but is limited in the 
use to which he can put the information.”133 
To reach this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit focused on the 
relationship between the phrase “exceeds authorized access” and other 
provisions of the CFAA while also briefly referring to Congress’s intent 
in selecting particular words for the statute.134  Beginning its analysis of 
the language by noting that it must “consider how the interpretation . . . 
will operate wherever in that section the phrase appears,” the court 
noted that, under a provision of the CFAA that “makes it a crime to 
exceed authorized access of a computer . . . without any culpable intent,” 
a broad reading of the phrase would criminalize “activities . . . routinely 
prohibited by many computer-use policies,” such as using an office 
computer for personal purposes.135  Based on the outcome revealed by 
this juxtaposition of suggested interpretation with actual statutory text, 
 
130.  676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
131.  Id. at 864; see also Note, supra note 10, at 772 (“[G]iven the number of courts that 
have found the ‘without authorization or exceed[ing] authorized access’ standard to be 
ambiguous, courts might adopt one of the narrow interpretations that would criminalize 
hacking but not violations of use agreements or breach of agency-related duties.” (alteration 
in original)). 
132.  Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856. 
133.  Id. at 856–57. 
134.  See id. at 858–61. 
135.  Id. at 859–60. 
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the court concluded that the language selected by Congress did not 
require imposing criminal liability on such a wide variety of conduct.136  
Further buttressing its conclusion, the court added as an aside that, 
“[w]ere there any need to rely on legislative history” as a type of 
intermediate evidence of the meaning that Congress attached to the 
statutory language, evidence exists to indicate that Congress rejected a 
broader definition for the term “exceeds authorized access” than 
appears in the enacted legislation.137 
With an opinion that places greater weight on Congress’s intended 
meaning for the CFAA, the Fourth Circuit also adopted a narrow 
reading of the statute’s unauthorized access provisions in WEC Carolina 
Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller.138  Miller allegedly downloaded 
confidential information from a laptop provided by WEC (his 
employer), resigned from his job to begin working for a competitor, and 
used the downloaded information to secure a business deal with a 
potential WEC client.139  Affirming the district court’s dismissal of 
WEC’s civil claim against Miller, the Fourth Circuit held that the two 
unauthorized access provisions “apply only when an individual accesses 
a computer without permission or obtains or alters information on a 
computer beyond that which he is authorized to access.”140 
 
136.  Id. at 857 (“If Congress meant to expand the scope of criminal liability to everyone 
who uses a computer in violation of computer use restrictions—which may well include 
everyone who uses a computer—we would expect it to use language better suited to that 
purpose.”). 
137.  Id. at 858 n.5 (“[T]he government claims that the legislative history supports its 
interpretation.  It points to an earlier version of the statute, which defined ‘exceeds 
authorized access’ as ‘having accessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity 
such access provides for purposes to which such authorization does not extend.’ Pub. L. No. 
99-474, § 2(c), 100 Stat. 1213 (1986).  But that language was removed and replaced by the 
current phrase and definition.  And Senators Mathias and Leahy—members of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee—explained that the purpose of replacing the original broader language 
was to ‘remove[] from the sweep of the statute one of the murkier grounds of liability, under 
which a[n] . . . employee’s access to computerized data might be legitimate in some 
circumstances, but criminal in other (not clearly distinguishable) circumstances.’  S. Rep. No. 
99-432, at 21, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479 at 2494.” (alterations in original)).  Reference to but 
not reliance on legislative history comes as no surprise in an opinion authored by Chief Judge 
Alex Kozinski.  See Kozinski, supra note 56, at 812 (“Led by Justice Scalia, a number of 
federal judges—I among them—have foresworn the use of legislative history as an 
interpretive tool.”); cf. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1093 (2015) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (discussion legislative history only for the benefit of “those who care about it” in 
an opinion joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas). 
138.  687 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2012). 
139.  Id. at 201–02. 
140.  Id. at 206–07. 
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Describing its approach to the decision, the Fourth Circuit indicated 
that it would begin with a “focus on the plain language of the statute, 
seeking ‘first and foremost . . . to implement congressional intent,’” an 
interpretive approach that focuses on the statutory language but that 
considers more evidence of intent than Wimsatt and Beardsley’s 
intermediate evidence might allow.141  Beginning by considering a 
variety of dictionary definitions related to “authorization,” the Fourth 
Circuit concluded that “an employee is authorized to access a computer 
when his employer approves or sanctions his admission to that 
computer.  Thus, he accesses a computer ‘without authorization’ when 
he gains admission to a computer without approval.”142  Going on to 
reason that a broad reading of the statute would make liable even an 
employee who “disregards his employer’s policy against downloading 
information to a personal computer so that he can work at home,” the 
court concluded that “Congress did not clearly intend to criminalize 
such behavior.”143  In the end, the court treated the CFAA as “a statute 
meant to target hackers” on its way to indicating that it would not 
“contravene Congress’s intent by transforming” the meaning of the 
statute.144 
Applying literary theory to an examination of the opinions by these 
two courts, the narrow interpretations of the unauthorized access 
provisions of the CFAA illustrate an approach to statutory text that 
bridges legal interpretation’s divide between textualism and 
intentionalism.  Both decisions begin with a focus on the statutory 
language.  The Ninth Circuit juxtaposes a proposed interpretation with 
other statutory provisions,145 and the Fourth Circuit parses the 
dictionary definitions of the disputed terms.146  Each decision 
supplements initial analysis of the language with limited evidence of 
intent.  But there the interpretive approaches diverge.  While the Ninth 
Circuit uses evidence of Congress’s understanding of the language used 
 
141.  Id. at 203 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d 
602, 607 (4th Cir. 2010)).  Although grounded in the statutory language, this statement 
seemingly appeals to subjective congressional intent, rather than the mere understanding of 
meaning associated with words.  See Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra note 5, at 478. 
142.  Miller, 687 F.3d at 204. 
143.  Id. at 206. 
144.  Id. at 207. 
145.  United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 859–60 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
146.  Miller, 687 F.3d at 204. 
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in the statute as a secondary support for its decision,147 the Fourth 
Circuit explicitly seeks to effectuate Congress’s subjective intent.148  
Although both opinions first consider the statutory text and then 
supplement that analysis with references to legislative intent, compared 
to the Fourth Circuit’s opinion, the Ninth Circuit’s juxtaposition of 
statutory provisions combined with a secondary reference to 
congressional intent more closely resembles an appropriate structural 
analysis using juxtaposition and intermediate evidence of legislative 
intent. 
B. Broad Interpretation of the CFAA 
By more explicitly limiting their analyses to the statutory language at 
issue, the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits place no restrictions on 
the scope of their own interpretations and—inconsistent with limited 
approach to interpretation for which textualists advocate149—have 
adopted broad readings of the CFAA as a result. 
In United States v. John,150 the Fifth Circuit settled on a more 
expansive interpretation of the CFAA, treating unauthorized “use of 
information obtained by permitted access to a computer system” as 
sufficient to incur liability under the CFAA’s unauthorized access 
provisions.151  John, an employee at a bank, used her authority to access 
the company’s customer database despite bank policies prohibiting such 
misuse of its computer system; she retrieved confidential customer 
information, which she provided to her half brother as part of a scheme 
to incur fraudulent charges.152  Affirming John’s conviction under the 
statute, the Fifth Circuit chose not to adopt her contention that the 
“statute only prohibits using authorized access to obtain information 
that [a person] . . . is not entitled to obtain.”153  Unlike the Nosal and 
Miller cases that adopted a narrow interpretation of the unauthorized 
access language, the Fifth Circuit in John limited the context within 
 
147.  See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858 n.5. 
148.  Miller, 687 F.3d at 203. 
149.  See Scalia, supra note 6, at 24 (“Words do have a limited range of meaning, and no 
interpretation that goes beyond that range is permissible.”). 
150.  597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010). 
151.  Id. at 271 (emphasis omitted). 
152.  Id. at 269, 272. 
153.  Id. at 269, 271. 
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which it situated its analysis when adopting this broad interpretation, 
juxtaposing its proffered meaning only with decisions by other courts.154 
Although the Eleventh Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit in adopting a 
broad interpretation of the unauthorized access provisions of the CFAA 
in United States v. Rodriguez,155 the Eleventh Circuit conducted a more 
complete analysis by juxtaposing its interpretation with other statutory 
provisions in addition to focusing on the statutory language in 
question.156  Employed by the Social Security Administration, Rodriguez 
used his access to the Administration database to retrieve confidential 
personal information about his romantic interests, contravening an 
Administration policy prohibiting accessing the database for non-
business reasons.157  The court held that “the plain language of the Act” 
required a finding that Rodriguez exceeded his authorized access 
because the Administration allowed access to the database “only . . . for 
business reasons” and Rodriguez admitted “that his access . . . was not in 
furtherance of his duties.”158  In addition to comparing its decision to 
cases from other circuits, the Eleventh Circuit situated its reading of the 
statutory provision within the context of the CFAA as a whole, 
countering Rodriguez’s claim that the CFAA required proof of a 
fraudulent purpose for a conviction by observing that only the felony 
provisions, rather than the misdemeanor provision under which 
Rodriguez faced liability, required such proof.159 
Approaching the issue from yet another angle, the Seventh Circuit—
in an opinion written by Judge Posner—adopted a particularly broad 
interpretation of the unauthorized access language in International 
Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin.160  After quitting his job but before 
beginning a new job competing with his former employer, Citrin deleted 
 
154.  Compare United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 859–60 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) 
(considering other statutory language), and Miller, 687 F.3d at 203 (implementing 
congressional intent by focusing on statutory language), with John, 597 F.3d at 271–73 
(comparing the facts of the case to existing case law). 
155.  628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010). 
156.  Id. at 1263–64. 
157.  Id. at 1260–62. 
158.  Id. at 1263. 
159.  Id. at 1263–64 (“The misdemeanor penalty provision of the Act under which 
Rodriguez was convicted does not contain any language regarding purposes for committing 
the offense.  See § 1030(c)(2)(A).  Rodriguez’s argument would eviscerate the distinction 
between these misdemeanor and felony provisions.  That Rodriguez did not use the 
information to defraud anyone or gain financially is irrelevant.”). 
160.  440 F.3d 418, 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 1872 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:1841 
data collected for the company, as well as data revealing his improper 
competitive conduct, from a laptop provided by his former employer.161  
He used a secure-erasure program that permanently prevented the 
employer from retrieving the information.162  Referring to agency 
principles, the court found that, by leaving his employment to compete 
with the employer, Citrin breached a duty of loyalty to the employer, 
terminating his agency relationship and therefore also terminating “his 
authority to access the laptop.”163 
While the Seventh Circuit’s opinion closely parses the statutory 
language, it also engages in an analysis of congressional intent that 
seems to exceed the limits for intermediate evidence suggested by 
Wimsatt and Beardsley.164  Observing that “[t]he difference between 
‘without authorization’ and ‘exceeding authorized access’ is paper thin,” 
the court used the aforementioned agency approach to find a complete 
absence of authorization.165  In transitioning to this discussion of the 
unauthorized access language, though, the court observed that Congress 
intended the CFAA “to reach the disgruntled programmer,” the type of 
individual who seeks to “trash the employer’s data system on the way 
out” of the company.166  Although the opinion does not cite a particular 
authority for this assumed congressional intent, the court does seem to 
invoke a basis for “how or why” Congress enacted the statute, a type of 
external evidence of the statute’s meaning.167  As a result, the analysis 
that Judge Posner articulates for the court rests upon a key assumption 
external to the statutory text, despite an otherwise strong foundation in 
the statutory language. 
Collectively, these three opinions adopting broad interpretations of 
the unauthorized access language in the CFAA consistently ground 
their analyses in the statutory text, but they fall short of using limited 
evidence of congressional understanding of the statutory language to 
place that analysis of statutory provisions into context with the larger 
 
161.  Id. at 419. 
162.  Id. 
163.  Id. at 420–21. 
164.  See id. at 420. 
165.  Id. at 420–21. 
166.  Id. at 420. 
167.  See id. at 420–21; see also Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra note 5, at 477–78 (describing 
external evidence as consisting of “revelations (in journals, for example, or letters or reported 
conversations) about how or why the poet wrote the poem”). 
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statutory structure.168  Among the three cases, only the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez clearly moves beyond its analysis of the 
plain language of the statutory text to compare the court’s interpretation 
of the unauthorized access language with other provisions of the CFAA 
and to consider the consequences of applying the chosen broad 
interpretation.169  Even Rodriguez, though, engages in only an oblique 
juxtaposition—briefly countering Rodriguez’s suggested 
interpretation—rather than using the juxtaposition to affirmatively 
support the propriety of adopting a broad reading of the statute.170  
Taken together, then, these cases begin to imply a relationship between 
a limited, language-focused reading of the statutory text and an eventual 
broad interpretation of the statute’s language. 
C. Assessing the Courts’ Analytical Approaches 
Undertaking a literary analysis of the opinions in these CFAA cases 
suggests that the opinions that situate a legal interpretation of the 
unauthorized access provisions within the context of the larger statutory 
structure more accurately implement the entire CFAA as a unified 
legislative enactment.  The type of evidence that an interpreter 
considers when approaching a text—whether internal evidence based on 
the words used in the text, external evidence of the author’s purpose for 
writing the text, or intermediate evidence of meaning that the author 
attached to the words in the text—will ultimately influence that 
interpreter’s final reading of it.171  By expanding the analysis beyond the 
language immediately at issue, a legal interpreter who performs a 
structural juxtaposition accounts for the consequences of the decision in 
a manner that strives to achieve a consistent statutory purpose—without 
assuming a hypothetical legislative intent underlying the statutory 
language.172 
 
168.  See supra notes 111–115 and accompanying text. 
169.  See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010). 
170.  See id. 
171.  Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra note 5, at 478 (“[A] critic who is concerned with 
[internal evidence] . . . and moderately with [external evidence] . . . will in the long run 
produce a different sort of comment from that of the critic who is concerned with [external 
evidence] . . . and with [intermediate evidence] . . . where it shades into [external evidence].”). 
172.  Compare United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 859–60 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) 
(considering the court’s interpretation in the context of other statutory provisions), with 
Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263 (reasoning based on plain meaning of language). 
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In juxtaposing its narrow interpretation of the unauthorized access 
language with other similar language throughout the CFAA, the Ninth 
Circuit in Nosal bolstered the propriety of its interpretation by 
concluding that only a narrow reading allowed the CFAA to function in 
a manner consistent with existing law.173  Considering a provision that 
imposes criminal liability for unauthorized access to “a computer 
connected to the Internet without any culpable intent,”174 the court 
recognized that if it applied a broad interpretation even “minor 
dalliances would become federal crimes” because the statute would then 
ensnare personal use of work computers, a use “routinely prohibited by 
many computer-use policies.”175  Building on this reasoning, the court 
then noted that a broad interpretation would expand the relationship 
between employer and employee beyond the realm of tort and contract 
law and into the sphere of criminal law,176 raising significant notice 
concerns in the process as a result of potential criminal sanctions arising 
from breach of contract situations between the employee and the 
employer.177 
Expanding the analysis still further, the Ninth Circuit went on to 
observe that the same concerns apply to public use of computers more 
generally; a broad reading could ensnare average computer users who 
breach a website’s terms of service, making criminals out of individuals 
who fail to comply with terms of use that, in some cases, change without 
notice to the users.178  Therefore, by juxtaposing its narrow 
 
173.  See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 859–62. 
174.  Id. at 859; see 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). 
175.  Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860. 
176.  Id. (“Employer–employee and company–consumer relationships are traditionally 
governed by tort and contract law; the government’s proposed interpretation of the CFAA 
allows private parties to manipulate their computer-use and personnel policies so as to turn 
these relationships into ones policed by the criminal law.”). 
177.  Id. (“[I]f minor personal uses are tolerated, how can an employee be on notice of 
what constitutes a violation sufficient to trigger criminal liability?”); see also Note, supra note 
10, at 753 (“[T]he truly concerning aspect of the CFAA’s operation is its delegation of power 
to private actors effectively to define, with hardly any constraint, what conduct will incur 
criminal liability under the statute.”). 
178.  Nosal, 676 F.3d at 861–62.  The court explained, 
Our access to . . . remote computers is governed by a series of private agreements 
and policies that most people are only dimly aware of and virtually no one reads or 
understands. 
. . . . 
Not only are the terms of service vague and generally unknown—unless you look 
real hard at the small print at the bottom of a webpage—but website owners retain 
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interpretation of the CFAA within this expansive statutory context, the 
court concluded that its interpretation appropriately enforced the 
provisions of the text by limiting the potential for criminal penalties 
resulting from breaches of contract.179 
By limiting themselves to the language of the disputed provisions, 
other opinions ultimately fail to take advantage of text-focused insights 
offered by using juxtaposition as a tool for statutory interpretation.180  In 
adopting a broad reading in Rodriguez, the Eleventh Circuit read the 
plain language of the CFAA as “foreclose[ing]” any argument for a 
narrow interpretation.181  Similarly, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in 
Citrin assumes a particular congressional intent and then discusses the 
agency-based justification for adopting a plain reading of the statute’s 
language.182  The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in John engages with the 
statutory definition of “exceeds authorized access” and proceeds to 
reason through that definition to define “without authorization” without 
reference to other statutory language.183  Although these opinions 
certainly benefit from the thoughtful reasoning of the authoring judges, 
those judges nevertheless strictly limit the information available for 
their own consideration and, therefore, deprive their analyses of insights 
available in the form of implicit meaning derived from relationships 
between the words in the text.  As a result, the decisions conclude with a 
broad interpretation of the statutory language without any regard for 
 
the right to change the terms at any time and without notice. . . .  Accordingly, 
behavior that wasn’t criminal yesterday can become criminal today without an act of 
Congress, and without any notice whatsoever. 
Id. 
179.  Id. at 863–64 (“This narrower interpretation is . . . a more sensible reading of the 
text and legislative history of a statute whose general purpose is to punish hacking—the 
circumvention of technological access barriers—not misappropriation of trade secrets—a 
subject Congress has dealt with elsewhere.”).  The dissent objected to the majority’s 
juxtaposition of the disputed passage with other subsections of the CFAA.  Id. at 866 
(Silverman, J., dissenting) (“[I]t does not advance the ball to consider, as the majority does, 
the parade of horribles that might occur under different subsections of the CFAA, such as 
subsection (a)(2)(C), which does not have the scienter or specific intent to defraud 
requirements that subsection (a)(4) has. . . .  I express no opinion on the validity or 
application of other subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 1030, other than § 1030(a)(4), and with all due 
respect, neither should the majority.”). 
180.  Compare United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010) (limiting 
analysis to the language of the statutory text), with Nosal, 676 F.3d at 859–60 (comparing 
disputed statutory provision with other aspects of the statutory text). 
181.  Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263. 
182.  Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006). 
183.  United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 270–72 (5th Cir. 2010). 
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internal limits imposed by the language’s relationship to the larger 
statutory text.184 
This difference in outcome between the courts performing a 
structural analysis that juxtaposes the disputed language with other 
statutory provisions and the courts that limit themselves to an analysis 
only of the language at issue highlights the significant consequences of 
the perspective adopted by the interpreting court.185  A judge 
 
184.  Although a textualist may argue that intratextual limits are illusory and prone to 
relativism, Professor Phelps and Chief Judge Manier anticipated this critique in their 
argument for interpretation at the point where the text intersects with the author.  Phelps & 
Pitts, supra note 6, at 365.  They quoted Gadamer to argue that a “new objectivity” results 
when an interpreter is “aware of one’s own bias, so that the text may present itself in all its 
newness and thus be able to assert its own truth against one’s own fore-meanings.”  Id. 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 238 (1975)).  
An interpreter aware of his or her own biases can achieve understanding when interpreting a 
text by recognizing the conflict between the language in the text and the biases that he or she 
brings to the interpretation.  See id.  Such restrictions imposed by the intersection of the 
interpreter and the text constrain the interpretation similar to the limits present when an 
interpreter conducts a structural juxtaposition to analyze disputed language. 
185.  Like the opinions in the CFAA circuit split, the Justices’ opinions in Yates v. 
United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015), a case from the Supreme Court’s October 2014 Term, 
also illustrate the impact that a broad or narrow perspective can have on an interpretation.  
Yates involved a fisherman charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1519 for throwing undersized 
fish overboard from his vessel after receiving a citation for violating federal fishing 
regulations.  135 S. Ct. at 1078–79.  Enacted as part of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 
§ 1519 makes it a felony to “knowingly alter[], destroy[], mutilate[], conceal[], cover[] up, 
falsif[y], or make[] a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to 
impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within 
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.”  Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, sec. 802, § 1519, 116 Stat. 745, 800 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1519 
(2012)).  Yates challenged the government’s contention that a fish was a “tangible object” 
under the statute on the grounds that “it would cut § 1519 loose from its financial-fraud 
mooring to hold that it encompasses any and all objects . . . destroyed with obstructive 
intent.”  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1079 (plurality opinion); see also Paul J. Larkin, Oversized 
Frauds, Undersized Fish, and Deconstruction of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 103 GEO. L.J. 
ONLINE 17 (2013) (discussing the consequences of interpreting the phrase “tangible object” 
apart from its context). 
In a plurality opinion joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, 
Justice Ginsburg announced the judgment of the Court and used § 1519’s statutory context to 
ultimately reach a narrow interpretation of the phrase.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1079 (plurality 
opinion) (“Mindful that in Sarbanes–Oxley, Congress trained its attention on corporate and 
accounting deception and cover-ups, we conclude that a matching construction of § 1519 is in 
order: A tangible object captured by § 1519, we hold, must be one used to record or preserve 
information.”).  Although Justice Ginsburg began her analysis for the plurality by considering 
dictionary definitions and by noting that Sarbanes–Oxley focused on white collar crime, id. at 
1081, she placed a greater emphasis on the structure and organization of Sarbanes–Oxley, as 
well as § 1519’s relationship with other sections in the United States Code, id. at 1083–86.  
Noting as well the canons of statutory interpretation and rule of lenity concerns raised by 
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approaching a case from a point of view focused on the specific statutory 
language at hand does not face the same restraints on meaning as a 
judge who chooses to consider the same language in the broad context 
created by other statutory provisions.186  If a judge evaluates language in 
isolation, then he or she risks losing the foundations for constructing 
meaning and thus falling prey to deconstructionism’s trap of undefined 
meaning.187 
Common sense therefore suggests that additional limits on 
interpretation will naturally lead to a narrow yet grounded reading of 
statutory language.  By placing constraints on the interpretation of 
language, legal analysis of statutory text that employs the literary 
technique of juxtaposition to derive meaning for disputed language from 
the structure of the statute necessarily leads to an interpretation firmly 
 
Yates, the opinion uses all of this information provided by § 1519’s context to “resist reading 
§ 1519 expansively to create a coverall spoliation of evidence statute.”  Id. at 1086–09.  Just as 
the circuits that considered contextual information arrived at a narrow interpretations of the 
CFAA, the plurality’s juxtaposition of § 1519 with the structure and language that comprise 
both Sarbanes–Oxley and the United States Code allowed the plurality to identify an 
underlying purpose for § 1519 that naturally narrows the meaning of the phrase “tangible 
object.” 
Advocating in dissent for a broad interpretation of § 1519, Justice Kagan—joined by 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas—strongly objected to the manner in which the 
plurality conducted its contextual analysis.  Id. at 1090–91 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Kagan made clear that she saw little room for ambiguity in the meaning of the phrase 
“tangible object.”  Id. at 1091 (“A fish is, of course, a discrete thing that possess physical 
form.”); see also id. at 1092 (agreeing with the plurality that context should influence 
interpretation, but arguing that “[s]tepping back from the words ‘tangible object’ provides 
only further evidence that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said”).  In 
particular, Justice Kagan criticized the plurality’s reliance on the statutory structure as a tool 
for narrowing the meaning of “tangible object.” Id. at 1094 (“I know of no other case in which 
we have begun our interpretation of a statute with the title, or relied on a title to override the 
law’s clear terms.”).  By rejecting the plurality’s structural juxtaposition, the dissent thus 
suggested a broad interpretation of “tangible object” inconsistent with an animating purpose 
implicit in the statutory language. 
186.  Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862 (observing that the circuits adopting a broad interpretation 
“looked only at the culpable behavior of the defendants before them, and failed to consider 
the effect on millions of ordinary citizens”).  Returning to his example of literary 
interpretations of the Eighth Amendment, Judge Posner notes that “[w]hen a court reads the 
Constitution it is looking, if not for guidance, at least for some limits on judicial discretion.  It 
would find none if it felt free to give ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ any meaning that the 
words permit as a matter of semantics.”  POSNER, supra note 18, at 301.  The overall structure 
of a statutory scheme can create the limiting context that Judge Posner desires. 
187.  See EAGLETON, supra note 5, at 114. 
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rooted in the language of the text while simultaneously cognizant of the 
context in which the interpretation must apply.188 
Furthermore, an interpretive approach that draws upon insights 
derived from relationships between words while also accepting the need 
for determinacy in language defeats the critique that literary analysis 
cannot provide useful insights for legal interpretation.189  In questioning 
the utility of literary analysis for legal interpretation, Judge Posner has 
argued that “[i]n our society the exercise of power by appointed officials 
with life tenure (true of all federal and, practically speaking, many state 
judges) is tolerated only in the belief that the power is somehow 
constrained.”190  However, far from adopting a particular literary 
approach like deconstruction—in which “[p]hilosophy, law, [and] 
political theory work by metaphor just as poems do”191—limited use of 
literary theory in legal interpretation actually provides the type of 
judicial restraint that Judge Posner seeks.192  By considering only certain 
evidence of legislative intent and by accounting for the relationships 
between words in statutory texts, a court that “interprets an ambiguous 
provision . . . [and] impos[es] its view on the rest of society, often with 
far-reaching practical consequences,”193 can ensure that the 
 
188.  Referring to the argument that the minimum age requirement for presidents set 
forth in Article II of the Constitution is actually indeterminate, Judge Posner has criticized 
the deconstructionist approach to legal interpretation for its failure to account for context.  
Compare Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1174 
(1985) (“[E]ven a seemingly determinate clause such as the minimum age for presidents 
remains indeterminate.  It is possible the age thirty-five signified to the Framers a certain 
level of maturity rather than some intrinsically significant number of years.”), with POSNER, 
supra note 18, at 288 (“[T]o read the provision [in that manner] . . . would be to take the 
words of the Constitution . . . out of a context that includes recognition of the importance of 
having orderly means of succession of officials, a practice of recording birth dates (and 
computing age, as not all societies do, from birth) . . . in order to minimize uncertainty, albeit 
at some cost in substantive justice.  This context enables us to see that the Constitution lays 
down a flat rule for age of eligibility so that everyone will know with certainly well in advance 
of an election whether all the candidates are eligible.”). 
189.  See Posner, supra note 33, at 1370 (“A judge who proclaimed himself a 
deconstructionist or even a New Critic would properly be excoriated for having cut himself 
loose from moorings that are part of the fundamental design of American government.”). 
190.  Id. 
191.  EAGLETON, supra note 5, at 126. 
192.  See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 857, 862–63 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) 
(focusing on the statutory text to adopt a narrow interpretation of the CFAA because the 
court found the language used by Congress “better suited to that purpose”). 
193.  Posner, supra note 33, at 1373. 
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interpretation it produces functions as a coherent addition to the context 
of existing law.194 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the face of the well-documented dispute between intentionalism 
and textualism, a literary approach to legal interpretation offers an 
additional avenue for discerning meaning in a statutory text.195  By 
juxtaposing a proposed interpretation for a disputed statutory provision 
with other portions of that statute and with limited evidence of the 
legislature’s understanding of the language used, a legal interpreter can 
situate his or her interpretation of statutory language within a broad 
statutory context.  Doing so can help a legal interpreter ensure that his 
or her interpretation remains internally consistent while simultaneously 
unified with the complex meaning attached to various provisions of the 
statutory text.  Rather than simply calling the meaning of all language 
into question, careful literary analysis of statutory text therefore serves 
as one useful tool for legal interpreters focused on the goal of attaching 
a definitive and consistent meaning to statutory language. 
JOEL M. GRACZYK 
 
194.  Conceding that “[t]here is no such thing as a collective mind” but observing that a 
legislature’s “collective intent can signify . . . agreement,” Judge Posner advocates for some 
use of legislative intent on the grounds that “legislators who vote to pass a bill may agree on 
what they expect it to accomplish, and their expectation if known by a court asked to 
interpret the law may be a valuable aid to interpretation.”  POSNER, supra note 18, at 315–16.  
This precedes his conclusion that “[t]here is thus no inconsistency in being an intentionalist 
judge but a formalist literary critic.”  Id. at 318. 
195.  See Chibundu, supra note 7, at 1445 (offering structural analysis as an “elaboration 
and an alternative to the . . . use of text and history as tools of statutory interpretation”). 
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